A First DFA on PRIDE: from Theory to Practice

Benjamin Lac (1, 2) , Marc Beunardeau (3, 4) , Anne Canteaut (5) , Jacques Jean-Alain Fournier (6) , Renaud Sirdey (7)

1 SAS-ENSMSE - Département Systèmes et Architectures Sécurisés
2 DPACA [Gardanne]
3 ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris
4 Ingenico Group S.A.
5 SECRET - Security, Cryptology and Transmissions
6 CEA-LETI - Commissariat à l'énergie atomique et aux énergies alternatives - Laboratoire d'Electronique et de Technologie de l'Information
7 LIST (CEA) - Laboratoire d'Intégration des Systèmes et des Technologies

PRIDE is one of the most efficient lightweight block cipher proposed so far for connected objects with high performance and low-resource constraints. In this paper we describe the first ever complete Differential Fault Analysis against PRIDE. We describe how fault attacks can be used against implementations of PRIDE to recover the entire encryption key. Our attack has been validated first through simulations, and then in practice on a software implementation of PRIDE running on a device that could typically be used in IoT devices. Faults have been injected using electromagnetic pulses during the PRIDE execution and the faulty ciphertexts have been used to recover the key bits. We also discuss some countermeasures that could be used to thwart such attacks.

Mots clés: lightweight cryptography; DFA; PRIDE; EM fault attacks

Domaines: Cryptographie et sécurité [cs.CR]; Micro et nanotechnologies/Microélectronique

Benjamin Lac, Marc Beunardeau, Anne Canteaut, Jacques Jean-Alain Fournier, Renaud Sirdey. A First DFA on PRIDE: from Theory to Practice. The 11th International Conference on Risks and Security of Internetand Systems - CRISIS 2016, Sep 2016, Roscoff, France. ⟨cea-01435998⟩