A First DFA on PRIDE: from Theory to Practice

Abstract : PRIDE is one of the most efficient lightweight block cipher proposed so far for connected objects with high performance and low-resource constraints. In this paper we describe the first ever complete Differential Fault Analysis against PRIDE. We describe how fault attacks can be used against implementations of PRIDE to recover the entire encryption key. Our attack has been validated first through simulations, and then in practice on a software implementation of PRIDE running on a device that could typically be used in IoT devices. Faults have been injected using electromagnetic pulses during the PRIDE execution and the faulty ciphertexts have been used to recover the key bits. We also discuss some countermeasures that could be used to thwart such attacks.
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https://hal-cea.archives-ouvertes.fr/cea-01435998
Contributor : Benjamin Lac <>
Submitted on : Monday, January 16, 2017 - 9:59:46 AM
Last modification on : Thursday, October 17, 2019 - 12:33:43 PM
Long-term archiving on : Monday, April 17, 2017 - 12:34:48 PM

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  • HAL Id : cea-01435998, version 1

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Benjamin Lac, Marc Beunardeau, Anne Canteaut, Jacques Jean-Alain Fournier, Renaud Sirdey. A First DFA on PRIDE: from Theory to Practice. The 11th International Conference on Risks and Security of Internetand Systems - CRISIS 2016, Sep 2016, Roscoff, France. ⟨cea-01435998⟩

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